Objective: The new contract for primary care in the UK o¡ers fee-for-service (FFS) payments for a wide range of activities in a quality outcomes framework (QOF), with payments designed to re£ect likely workload. This study aims to explore the link between these ¢nancial incentives and the likely population health gains.
Introduction
The new General Medical Services (GMS) contract, signed in February 2003, is a major investment in UK primary care of £8.0 billion over three years. 1 It also represents a significant shift in the mode of funding for primary care practices, with increased use of fee-forservice (FFS) to incentivize quality improvement. 2, 3 The new contract provides direct financial incentives to the majority (around 65%) of UK general practitioners (GPs) who are self-employed partners -known as 'principals' -and who share in the profits and capital gains of their practices. The increasing number of salaried GPs employed by practices may also benefit indirectly, to the extent that the new FFS payments may allow practices to pay higher salaries and/or to offer a share of the additional profits.
FFS payments were originally introduced in the 1990 GP contract for selected public health services including vaccinations, immunizations and cervical cancer screening. 4 The new 2003 contract greatly extends the range and overall magnitude of FFS payment. It awards payments for a wide range of services deemed to improved quality of care, which are specified in a 'quality outcomes framework' (QOF). This contains a blizzard of 151 quality indicators in four broad areas: clinical (81 indicators), organizational (56 indicators), additional services (10 indicators) and patient experience (four indicators). The indicators were selected from existing evidence-based schemes such as the Royal College of General Practitioners' Quality Team Development and Practice Accreditation Scheme. 1 The new QOF payments apply to all GP practices, including ones opting for locally negotiated Personal Medical Services (PMS) contracts based on raw capitation as well as ones opting for GMS contracts based on risk-adjusted capitation.
The relative payment for each quality indicator depends on a points system designed to reflect likely workload. Each quality indicator is allocated a maximum payment. Typically, points are awarded in proportion to the achieved level of the indicator, with a graduated scale of payments that starts above a minimum threshold level and ends once a maximum threshold level has been reached. For example, the clinical quality indicator CHD 2 is defined as 'The percentage of patients with newly diagnosed angina (diagnosed after 1 April 2003) who are referred for exercise testing and/or specialist assessment'. For this indicator, the two payment stage thresholds are set at 25% and 90%, and the maximum payment is seven points. Practices scoring between minimum and maximum thresholds get a proportion of the maximum points available. For example, if a practice scored 45% in the above indicator CHD 2, they would receive 20/ 65th of the maximum seven points available.
Over half of the maximum points (550 out of 1050) are allocated to clinical performance (see p 22-23 of Department of Health 1 ). The monetary value of a point depends on practice list size and demographics, but, for an 'average' practice with a patient population of 5500 and three whole-time principals, the maximum payment in the clinical area alone will amount to £66,000 per annum from 2005/6. This is based on an 'average' practice payment of £120 per point in 2005/6, rising from £75 per point in 2004/5 (see p 20 of Department of Health 1 ). This is not pure profit, however, since the practice bears the additional costs of improving and documenting its quality indicators, such as investment in new staff and IT systems, as well as increased pension costs for salaried GPs.
The contract's supporting documentation includes extensive evidence for the clinical effectiveness of all clinical activities that attract quality payment. However, no evidence is provided about the development of the points system that determines the strength of incentive for different activities. The main principle underlying development of the points system is stated, however. The points system was designed 'for rewarding GPs and their staff for the volume and quantity of work done'. 3, 5 The value of the points for each area was determined by two small groups of GPs estimating the work required to achieve the different quality criteria. 3 This approach -basing rewards on perceptions of likely workload -has the advantage that it encourages GPs to give equal priority to all quality indicators, rather than prioritizing the less burdensome ones. A possible disadvantage, however, is that likely workload may not reflect likely benefit -in particular, likely health gain. If so, activity may be skewed towards high-reward high-workload areas with low gains to population health, and away from low-reward low-workload areas with high gains to population health.
An alternative approach would be to base payments on likely gain to population health. This approachrewarding achievement, rather than effort -would encourage GPs to prioritize activities with high benefits to population health. One possible disadvantage is that it would be hard to set payments in the areas of primary care activity where the evidence base is so thin and professional consensus so lacking that extreme uncertainty surrounds any point estimate of likely health gain. Nevertheless, if likely workload can be estimated by clinical experts -as happened in the design of the new contract -then so can likely health gain.
This study investigates whether or not these two approaches -rewarding likely workload and rewarding likely health gain -are equivalent in practice, focusing on areas of practice where robust evidence on health gain is readily available. It explores the link between the rewards for different clinical services, based on likely workload, and the likely gains to population health.
Methods
Our study uses published estimates of the population health gains from eight broad categories of prescribing intervention. These estimates were reported in a study by McColl et al. which developed a set of evidencebased quality indicators for primary care. 6 That study has been widely cited and endorsed (25 citations listed on the BMJ website as at 7 December 2004). To estimate the corresponding strength of financial incentive in the new contract for each intervention, we list all the clinical indicator quality payments associated with the intervention and then add up the associated points. This enables us to examine whether or not there is any association between population health gain and strength of financial incentive across the eight The total points associated with each intervention were then converted into financial payments based on the assumption that payment for each quality point is £120 per year for a general practice of average size. 1 The details of our payment calculations are displayed in Table 1 , which lists the quality payments relating to each of the McColl indicators.
The data are presented both in tabular format and graphically, using a scatterplot, to allow visual comparison of pay against health gain for the eight McColl interventions. Given the small sample size, formal statistical tests have low power to detect any relationship between pay and health gain. For completeness, however, formal statistical tests were carried outalthough these tests must of course be treated with caution. The Shapiro-Wilk W test was used to test for normality in both variables. Since one variable was not normally distributed, a non-parametric Spearman rank correlation test was used in addition to a Pearson correlation test. A two-sided test was used to test the null hypothesis of no relationship between pay and (Table 3 ). We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between pay and health gain.
Results

Discussion
There are at least three weaknesses in our approach. First, it only covers a subset of the QOF indicatorsalbeit an important subset that accounts for 57% (£37,800 per annum) of the maximum possible payment for all clinical indicators and, according to McColl et al., has the potential to save 743 lives per year per 100,000 population. Second, population health gain is defined in terms of 'number of lives saved', which does not take into account how many years of life are saved or of what quality. Many of the 'lives saved' by the McColl interventions may be frail elderly individuals with relatively short life expectancy and quality of life. So in future, it may be preferable to take into account both the length and quality of life saved -i.e. to define health gain in terms of quality adjusted life years (QALYs). However, a more comprehensive QALY gain data-set is not yet available. Third, the McColl data are now seven years old and there have been minor changes in the evidence base. For example, beta blockers are now used routinely in heart failure 9although the new GMS contract also fails to include this quality marker.
Our central finding is that, across the eight individual McColl interventions, there appears to be no relationship between the incentive payment (based on likely workload) and the likely health gain -either through visual inspection or formal statistical tests. In this case, likely workload does not appear to be well correlated with likely health gain. Furthermore, two of the McColl interventions -the use of warfarin in atrial fibrillation Original research Incentive payments in the new NHS contract for primary care to prevent stroke and statins in primary preventionreceive no quality incentive payment at all. This contrasts with other areas that receive incentives but have no robust evidence base, such as personal learning plans. This finding suggests that there is a real danger the incentive payments may skew activity towards highly rewarded labour-intensive activities with relatively low benefits to population health. Activities that deliver greater health gains but receive less (or no) financial incentive may be downplayed: what is not incentivized may be marginalized. 10 We propose that incentive payment schemes such as those in the new GMS contract should aim to relate rewards to achievement of benefits to the patient -and, in particular, population health gain. In doing so, it is not enough to demonstrate that an activity has some effect on population health -however small -and then spend money -however much -in order to encourage that activity. The size of the health gain matters. So does the size of the incentive payment. This is because incentive payments have opportunity costs to population health, of two kinds. First, money spent on incentive payments could be used for other activities that improve health (in primary care or elsewhere). Second, scarce staff time directed towards the QOF activities by FFS incentives will be diverted from other activities in primary care that may improve health. If pay fails to mirror likely health gain, then there is a danger that clinical activity may be skewed towards costly but only marginally effective interventions to the detriment of low-cost and highly beneficial activities. Of course, achieved benefits other than health gain may also be worth incentivizing -for example, patient experience. It is noteworthy in this respect that points for patient experience are currently awarded merely for recording information, and do not depend on the scores achieved.
It is inevitable that the new contract will lead to an increase in the QOF activities covered by FFS payment. But will these improve population health? Ultimately, answering this central question will require analysis of the health outcomes of introducing the contract, rather than (as in our study) estimates of likely outcomes. It will require evidence not only on the benefits of the contract -in particular, the health benefits of the increased activity in QOF areas -but also on the opportunity costs in terms of resources and staff time invested in QOF activities rather than other activities that might benefit population health. For example, staff may divert their time away from discussions with the patient aimed at providing information and reassurance -despite the award of patient experience points for exceeding the target of at least 8 min average consultation length. 2 This in turn may impact on patient compliance, with consequent harms to population health. Identifying potential harms of this kind will be difficult, because the contract will only generate routine data on QOF activities. Data on other activities in primary care will remain hard to gather, as will data on clinical outcomes. Rigorous evaluation of this ambitious and expensive social experiment will therefore be a substantial challenge.
